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 1. Introduction  
It has long been argued that the income distribution of a country is associated to its 
institutional development and its degree of social cohesion and conflictivity. An 
economy where income is more equally distributed is probably characterised by better 
and more stable institutions, fewer conflicts and a stronger sense of social cohesion. 
However, although intuitive, the links are theoretically ambiguous and have not been 
well-established by the empirical literature. The difficulties are enormous: (i) there are 
not obvious empirical counterparts for concepts like institutions, social cohesion and 
conflicts; (ii) the theory stresses that causality may go in all directions, (iii) it is not 
clear which dimension of the income distribution (inequality, polarisation, poverty, 
mobility) is the most relevant, and (iv) the data at hand is insufficient to implement 
valid tests for causality. Despite these empirical limitations, the topic is sufficiently 
important to have attracted the attention of social scientists for decades. The academic 
community is continuously searching for new datasets and ideas that contribute to the 
understanding of the links between income distribution, institutions and conflicts.  
The issue is particularly relevant for Latin America and the Caribbean (henceforth, 
LAC). This region has arguably the highest levels of inequality in the world, and it is 
also one of the regions with weaker institutions, and higher levels of conflictivity and 
violence. Moreover, the evidence suggests increasing income disparities in several LAC 
countries over the last two decades, raising questions on the implications for the socio-
political instability.1   
This document explores the relationship between income distribution, institutions and 
conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean by using a new database of income 
distribution statistics computed from microdata of 54 household surveys from 21 LAC 
countries in the period 1989-2004.  
The paper makes at least three contributions to the existing literature. On the one hand, 
it is based on a set of distributional measures computed from microdata using a 
consistent methodology across countries. The cross-country literature has been 
increasing at a fast pace since the 1990s, fuelled by the availability of household survey 
data. However, several of these studies include a large number of country/year 
observations without being cautious over the comparability issues. Although naturally 
not fully consistent, the database used for this paper has been constructed taking the 
comparability problems seriously into account.  
Second, we analyse the interactions between several measures of institutions and 
conflict with three different dimensions of the income distribution: inequality, 
polarisation and poverty. Institutions and conflict may interact in different ways with 
                                                 
1 See IADB (1998), Morley (2000), Ganuza et al. (2001), Bourguignon and Morrison (2003) and 
Gasparini (2003) for evidence on inequality in LAC.  
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these three characteristics. In fact, the paper provides some preliminary evidence that in 
the LAC context institutional development has been associated to lower poverty, but not 
significantly lower inequality and polarisation. Instead, conflicts seem more related to 
inequality and polarisation than to income poverty.  
Some authors have recently argued for the use of polarisation as a key variable when 
studying conflict and social tension. A population is polarised if there are few groups of 
important size in which their members feel some degree of identification with members 
of their own group, and feel alienated from members of other groups. The research on 
polarisation is mainly motivated by the conjecture that the differences among 
homogeneous groups cause social tension and instability. To our knowledge this is the 
first study in LAC that includes polarisation measures, along with inequality and 
poverty indicators, as potential covariates of institutional and conflict variables.  
Most of the empirical research is ideally aimed at detecting causal relationships among 
variables. Is the income distribution affecting the development of certain institutions, 
and provoking social tension, conflicts and violence? Or the causality goes in the 
opposite direction, e.g. certain institutions preclude changes in the income distribution? 
Are there some factors affecting the income distribution and the political institutions at 
the same time, and then creating a correlation without causality between them? As 
commented above, these questions are very difficult to answer, and we do not attempt to 
do it in this paper, due to the unavailability of the data needed for that task. We do show 
the structure of correlations among variables, and try to lay down consistent 
interpretations of the results based on the theory.  
We divide the empirical research into two stages. First we explore the relationship 
between measures of the income distribution and institutions, and then we investigate 
the links between these variables and measures of conflict, instability and corruption.  
The rest of the document is organised as follows. In section 2 we survey the literature 
on the links between income distribution, institutions, conflict and corruption. Section 3 
discusses alternative measures of different dimensions of the income distribution. We 
present the database from which we draw the statistics, and summarise the main 
patterns. In section 4 we survey an increasing number of studies containing data on 
institutions, conflicts and corruption, and show basic statistics for the region. In sections 
5 and 6, which are the core of the paper, we show and discuss the results of empirically 
analysing the relationship between income distribution, institutions, conflicts and 
corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean. We close in section 7 with some brief 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. The literature   
In the last three decades many countries in the world have witnessed a sizeable increase 
in income inequality. This fact brought the topic of income distribution “out of the cold” 
(Atkinson, 1997). At the same time, economists realised the inconvenience of treating 
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institutions as a black box, and hence a literature on institutions, identified nowadays as 
the New Institutional Economics, started to develop. All of this provided the necessary 
inputs for the theories linking income distribution with institutions and conflict to 
emerge.  
In this paper we are particularly interested in those contributions that empirically assess 
these links. That literature, which has been growing at a fast pace, faces the problem of 
causal inference, in particular due to the need of relying on cross-country statistical 
analysis.2 Although researchers are using state-of-the-art techniques to disentangle the 
links between income distribution, institutions and conflict, the issue of causality 
remains pretty much unsolved.  
Ritzen, Easterly and Woolcock (REW) (2000 and 2005) put forward the hypothesis that 
social cohesion (in their paper measured by income inequality, share of middle class and 
ethnic fractionalisation) determines institutional quality, which in turn is a key 
determinant for economic growth. In a similar vein Keefer and Knack (2002) conjecture 
that social polarisation (measured as income inequality, land inequality and ethnic 
fragmentation) affects growth through the institutional channel. They argue that the rule 
of law is endogenous to social polarisation: a more polarised economy would cause 
investors to perceive the rule of law not as a solid institution, and flee away from the 
country, affecting economic growth. Glaeser (2005) finds that a balanced income 
distribution is highly correlated with high quality institutions, but is very cautious not to 
speak of causality given the identification problems commented above.  
After reviewing the negative correlation between income inequality and institutional 
quality, Chong and Gradstein (2004, 2005) put forward the idea of bidirectional 
causality. While it could be true that better institutions cause a reduction in income 
inequality, they propose a model where it also could happen that economic conditions, 
as an increase in income inequality, cause institutions to deteriorate.3 Making use of 
state-of-the-art econometrics, such as GMM techniques and VAR, they find supporting 
evidence for the double-causality theory. They conclude that the link that goes from 
income inequality to institutions is stronger than the one that goes the other way. 
The view that economic conditions, such as the shape of the income distribution, may 
affect institutional quality is not new. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002, 2005) argue 
that initial factor endowments, such as the distribution of wealth, human capital and 
political power, play a key role in accounting for the dissimilar degree of institutional 
development among former colonies. Boix (2003) also argues that higher income 
inequality induces a lower probability of democratisation. 
                                                 
2 A typical bias appears when omitting a variable correlated with the treatment variable that also affects 
the dependent variable. Other frequently-found problems are the self-selection, the post-treatment and the 
non-independence biases. For an in-depth analysis of these issues see Przeworski (2005). 
3 See also Cervellati et al. (2005) for a theory that addresses bicausality.  
 4
So far we have reviewed papers dealing with the link between income distribution and 
institutions. Now we focus on the relationship with conflict and instability. One of the 
classic references for this topic is Alesina and Perotti (1996). This paper argues that 
income inequality generates social discontent that translates into political conflict and 
instability. They find empirical evidence validating the hypothesis in a sample of 70 
countries for the period 1960-85. Then, they argue that political instability reduces 
investment, which in turn harms the growth process. Sachs (1990) studies how high 
income inequality in Latin America stimulates social disorder and political conflict. He 
argues that social discontent prevent leaders from applying good policies and turn them 
into populist ones.       
Regarding the link between corruption, institutions and income distribution, the 
literature is vast and growing. The theoretical underpinnings for this link are drawn 
from the ideas of Krueger (1974). She asserts that corruption could create inefficiencies 
that are beneficial to some groups of people and harm others. The idea later develop by 
other scholars is that corruption may help the rich stay rich and prevent the poor from 
escaping poverty, increasing the level of inequality in the income distribution. 
Corruption distorts institutions of governance, and through the institutional channel 
affects the income distribution.  
One of the main empirical references is Li et al. (2000). They find that the relationship 
between corruption and income distribution is not linear, but has an inverted U shape. 
Gupta et al. (2002) find that corruption increases income inequality and poverty through 
various channels. They argue that by biasing the tax system in favour of the rich and 
powerful, not targeting social programs, lowering social spending, and providing an 
unequal access to education, corruption increases income inequality and poverty. They 
test this hypothesis using cross-country regressions for the period 1980-1997. In order 
to asses causality they instrumentate the variables, and argue that corruption is the cause 
of both income inequality and poverty.  
In a recent paper for the US states Dincer and Gunalp (2005) also find that corruption 
increases income inequality. One of the advantages of this study is the use of 
information from only one country, which ameliorates the problem of data comparison 
across countries. 
In summary, the empirical literature on income distribution, institutions, conflict and 
corruption has been growing recently fuelled by the availability of new data sets. The 
basic links among these variables are being documented, and more complex interactions 
are being examined. In sections 5 and 6 we explore the links among these variables in 
the Latin American context. But first, we briefly present the measures of income 
distribution, institutions and conflict to be used in the empirical analysis.  
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3. Measures of income distribution  
The term income distribution refers to a list specifying the income level of each 
individual in the economy. Several dimensions can be defined from an income 
distribution: poverty, inequality and polarisation are among the most relevant ones. 
Poverty basically refers to the proportion of people below a threshold income level 
known as poverty line; inequality refers to proportional differences in income levels 
across the population, while polarisation is related to groups internally homogeneous 
that antagonize each other.  
In this paper we measure poverty as the proportion of individuals with household per 
capita income below a threshold level. We take the international standard of USD2 a 
day at PPP values as the poverty line.4 The USD-2-a-day line is used, along with the 
USD-1-a-day line, to monitor the Millennium Development Goals in middle-income 
countries, like most of the LAC ones. Although the USD-1 or 2-a-day lines have been 
criticised, their simplicity and the lack of reasonable and easy-to-implement alternatives 
have made them the standard for international poverty comparisons.  
The economic unfairness of a society has always been associated to income inequality. 
The concept of inequality is closely linked to the principle of Dalton-Pigou: a transfer 
from an individual with higher income to another individual with lower income 
generates a more equal distribution.5 The literature on the measurement of inequality is 
vast. In this paper although we report a set of indices to characterise inequality in the 
region, we focus on the Gini coefficient when turning to the empirical analysis of the 
interactions between inequality, institutions and conflict.  
The notion of polarisation refers to homogeneous clusters that antagonize with each 
other. The difference with inequality can be explained with an example. Suppose a 
country with six persons labelled as A, B, C, D, E, F with incomes equal to $ 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5 and 6, respectively. Suppose now two transfers of one peso: the first one from C to A, 
and the second one from F to D. The two transfers are equalizing (from richer to poorer 
persons), so all inequality indices complying with the Dalton-Pigou criterion will fall, or 
at least not increase. The inequality analysis assesses the new situation as “better” than 
the initial one. In particular, it is expected that the new distribution leads to a more 
stable society.   
 
                                                 
4  See Ravallion et al. (1991), Chen and Ravallion (2001) and SEDLAC (2005). 
5 See Atkinson and Bourguignon (eds.) (2000), Deaton (1997), Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001).  
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Histograms of the income distribution  
Before and after an inequality-decreasing  
but polarisation-increasing transfer 
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Notice, however, that in this example the new income distribution has three persons 
with $ 2 (A, B and C), and three persons with $5 (D, E and F). The population in this 
country is divided into two clearly differentiated groups that are internally perfectly 
homogeneous. Although less unequal, this society has become polarised. In the new 
situation people may identify themselves as part of clearly defined groups which are 
significantly different from the rest. This polarisation may derive in greater social 
tension than in the initial distribution, and then in more social and political instability. 
The polarisation measures depend on the degree of equality within each group 
(identification) and the degree of differences across groups (alienation). In this paper we 
present several measures of income polarisation, but for simplicity we concentrate in the 
indicator recently developed by Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) when analyzing the 
interactions with institutions and conflicts. 
The previous example is designed to illustrate a case where polarisation goes in 
opposite direction to inequality. However, it is likely that in most cases polarisation and 
inequality go in the same direction. Thus, the analysis of polarisation should be viewed 
as complementary to that of inequality. Both polarisation and inequality are different 
although related dimensions of the same distribution.  
Social cohesion and the development of a strong institutional framework surely depend 
on both economic and non-economic variables. Even in a quite economically 
homogeneous society tensions may emerge because of, for instance, religious or racial 
differences. Similarly, a very economically-polarised and unequal society may exhibit 
high social cohesion and strong institutions if the sharing of some values, ideas and 
views is strong. Even if the income distribution remains stable in a given period of time, 
internal tensions may decrease under certain circumstances (e.g. under a war with other 
country) and increase in others. This study focuses only on economic inequality, 
polarisation and poverty. We expect these measures to be positively correlated with 
situations of instability, lack of social cohesion, social tensions, and violence.  
This study deals with the income distribution. Income is usually taken as a proxy for 
well-being, but it is certainly not the only variable we should consider in the analysis. 
People may care not about incomes but about the opportunities to generate incomes, and 
then be more concerned about the distribution of variables like education, assets, health, 
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or access to basic services. In this document we follow the tradition of studying the 
income distribution as a proxy for the distribution of living standards.    
We study static measures of the income distribution i.e. those computed from cross-
section data from household surveys. Following the above example, suppose that for 
seasonal reasons individuals A, B and C earn $2 per month in the first half of the year 
and $ 5 per month in the second half, while individuals D, E and F earn $5 in the first 
semester, and $2 in the second one. In each semester, the income distribution is unequal 
and polarised; however, on average the yearly income distribution is egalitarian and not 
polarised. Unfortunately, household surveys do not follow individual over long periods 
of time to allow computing a more dynamic picture of the income distribution. The 
inequality studies exploiting the few short panels in the region suggest that although the 
levels of income inequality are lower than when using cross-sections, the basic patterns 
persist. In particular, the region continues exhibiting very high levels of inequality. Our 
conjecture, then, is that the income distribution picture emerging from our study would 
not be very different from the one obtained with panel data.  
The income distribution statistics of this paper are based on microdata from a large set 
of household surveys carried out by the National Statistical Offices of the LAC 
countries in the period 1989-2004. The database used for this study is a sample of a 
larger database put together by CEDLAS and the World Bank: the Socioeconomic 
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). The sample includes 
information for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (see table 3.1). 
The sample covers all countries in mainland Latin America and four of the largest 
countries in the Caribbean – Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname. In each 
period the sample of countries represents more than 92% of LAC total population. 
Whenever possible we select three years in each country to characterize the two main 
periods in the last 15 years: the growth period of the early and mid 1990s when several 
structural reforms were implemented, and the stagnation and crisis period of the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Unfortunately, there is not enough information to characterize 
the recent recovery of the LAC economies that started around 2003.   
Household surveys are not uniform across LAC countries. The issue of comparability is 
of a great concern. We make all possible efforts to make statistics comparable across 
countries and over time by using similar definitions of variables in each country/year, 
and by applying consistent methods of processing the data. However, perfect 
comparability is far from being assured. A trade-off between accuracy and coverage 
arises. The particular solution adopted contains an unavoidable degree of arbitrariness. 
We try to be ambitious enough to include all countries in the analysis, and accurate 
enough so not to push the comparisons too much.  
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In what follows we briefly comment on the main patterns of the income distribution in 
the region.6 As commented above LAC is characterised by high levels of polarisation 
and inequality compared to the rest of the world. Poverty is also relatively high, 
although lower than in Africa and most of Asia. Table 3.2 presents a set of polarisation, 
inequality and poverty measures computed over the distribution of household per capita 
income, while table 3.3 shows statistics for the distribution of earnings.  
There is a considerable degree of dispersion among the countries in the region in the 
three distributional dimensions (Figure 3.1). A set of nations have relatively low (for 
LAC standards) levels of inequality, polarisation and poverty: Uruguay, Costa Rica and 
to a lesser extent Argentina belong to that group. Chile enjoys low poverty despite 
relatively high levels of income inequality and polarisation. To a lesser extent that is 
also the case of Brazil, Panama and Colombia. Some countries are characterised by high 
inequality and poverty: Haiti and Bolivia are the two main examples.  
Correlation among polarisation indices is high (Table 3.4). These indicators are also 
highly correlated to inequality measures, in particular to the Gini coefficient. Countries 
with high inequality tend to have also a highly polarised income distribution. Due to this 
fact, in the analysis that follows we find similar interactions between 
institutions/conflicts and either polarisation or inequality. The correlations with poverty 
are instead much weaker. In the case of the polarisation indicators, the correlations with 
the poverty headcount ratio are positive but not significant at the 5% confidence level. 
The poverty measures that take the income distribution among the poor into account 
(e.g. FGT(2)) are more closely linked to polarisation and inequality indices.  
Although LAC countries share many structural characteristics, have experienced similar 
shocks, and most of them have carried out similar economic policies during the 1990s, 
the distributional performances have been strikingly heterogeneous (see Figure 3.2). 
Polarisation and inequality decreased in Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
also slightly in Chile. In contrast, the income distributions in Argentina, Uruguay, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Panama and Peru became more polarised 
and unequal. In some cases the changes have been small and even negligible, but in 
others changes have been sizeable. That is the case of Argentina, Colombia and 
Venezuela, where poverty also went significantly up. Instead, income poverty was 
reduced in Chile, Brazil, urban Bolivia and some Central American countries.  
Summarizing, on average changes have been small: polarisation and inequality slightly 
increased, while poverty went moderately down in the region. However, as stated 
above, the behaviour of the averages is not a good representation of the great diversity 
of experiences within the region.  
 
                                                 
6 A detailed analysis of polarisation and inequality statistics can be found in a companion paper 
(Gasparini et al. 2006). Poverty statistics are analyzed in Gasparini et al. (2005).  
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4. Measures of institutions and conflicts   
In the last decades there has been a renewed interest among economists in 
understanding the working of institutions. The economists’ policy prescriptions were 
usually based in models that treated institutions as a black box, and as a consequence 
did not take the form of government, the country’s history or their culture and habits 
into account.  
In this paper we follow North’s (1990) definition: “Institutions are the humanly devised 
constrains that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constrains (e.g., 
rules, laws, constitutions), informal constrains (e.g., norms of behaviour, conventions, 
self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics”. Ideally, we 
would like to have separate and objective measures of formal and informal institutions, 
although, naturally, measuring informal constraints is an extremely hard task.  
In this paper we use two types of measures: indices of broad-base institutions, and 
measures of specific political institutions. The first type of indices combines 
information on formal institutions with measures of the actual functioning of certain 
institutions and rules. For instance, indices do not just look at what a Constitution says 
about property rights, but try to assess the actual respect for the private property. 
Naturally, this introduces some subjectivity into the measures, since the assessment of 
the working of institutions cannot be made on fully objective grounds. However, 
disregarding informal institutions for the sake of objectivity may not be a good solution. 
For instance, although many Latin American constitutions are inspired by the US or 
European constitutions, the actual functioning of the formal institutions is certainly very 
different.   
The measurement of specific political institutions, instead, can be done in a relatively 
objective way. Once we agree on the formula to compute the index, the measures are 
easily reproduced by any researcher.  
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the main measures of institutions available. In the 
Appendix we provide a brief explanation of each measure. Figure 4.1 shows data for 
two of the main indicators: the Voice and Accountability Index (VAI) and The Rule of 
Law Index (RLI). The VAI measures the extent to which citizens of a country are able 
to participate in the selection of governments. It includes a number of indicators 
measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. The 
RLI measures the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern their 
interactions. The index includes several indicators which measure the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions 
of the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of 
contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an 
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social 
interactions, and the extent to which property rights are protected.  
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OECD countries have developed stronger institutions than LAC countries (Figures 4.1 
and 4.2).7 For instance, for the RLI the average OECD value is higher than the 
maximum in LAC (Chile). In fact, Chile seems an outlier in the LAC context. If we take 
that country out of the sample, the contrast is even more impressive. OECD countries 
are also more homogeneous than LAC nations regarding institutions. The coefficient of 
variation for the VAI is 0.04 for OECD, and 0.31 for LAC.  
Now we focus on LAC, and add the Government Effectiveness Index (GEI) into the 
analysis. This indicator measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of 
the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service 
from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
policies.  
Figure 4.3 documents the large institutional volatility in the region. Over the last decade 
LAC countries have experienced an increase in the lack of respect for the rule of law, 
but the participation of the citizens in the selection of government continued to grow.  
The second panel in figure 4.3 focus on the VAI and breaks down LAC in three regions: 
South America, Central America and the Caribbean.8 South America has become the 
worst region in terms of Voice and Accountability after the problems of representation 
that various countries (Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela and Argentina) 
have suffered during this period. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates other broad-base institutions indices: the Political Constraint 
Index, the Legal Structure Index and the Democracy Index. Chile ranks as one of the 
countries with the best institutional quality in LAC, while Haiti ranks as the worst. 
The rest of the section is aimed at presenting statistics on conflict and corruption. Table 
4.3 shows the Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index (PSAVI), and the 
Control of Corruption Index (CCI) for LAC countries. The PSAVI (also labelled as the 
General Conflict Index) combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly 
unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. The 
CCI is a measure of perceptions of corruption, defined as the exercise of public power 
for private gain.  
The level of conflictivity is substantially higher in LAC, when compared to OECD 
countries (figure 4.5). A majority of LAC countries has negative values for the  Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence index, while in the OECD just one country, Turkey, 
out of 29 is in that situation. Again, the dispersion in this index is significantly higher 
for LAC countries (0.64 vs. 0.09 in the OECD).  
                                                 
7 For comparison purposes we take Mexico out of the OECD group since it also belongs to LAC.  
8 By concentrating in the VAI more countries could be included in the graph (compared to the first panel 
in figure 4.3). The countries that were added are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belice, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad 
and Tobago. Including these countries somewhat modifies the average LAC pattern for the VAI.  
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During the last decade (1996-2004) there has been an increase in the level of conflict in 
the region (figure 4.6). This was mainly driven by the political conflicts that unravelled 
in many South American countries during this period. Central America is the only 
region that experienced a positive change in this index when looking at the whole 
decade. Since 2000 the level of conflict seems to have risen across all Latin America.  
Figure 4.7 illustrates the country values of the Labour Standard Index (LS) (also known 
as Labour Conflict Index). This index is a composed measure of the worker’s freedom 
to organize themselves, negotiate collectively and to be declared in strike. It covers a 
variety of rights violated, but does not measure the frequency of its violation neither the 
quantity of workers affected by such violations. Venezuela, that lags behind in most of 
the institutional and general conflict indicators, is one of the countries with the lowest 
levels of labour conflict.   
Corruption is also perceived as a more serious problem in LAC countries than in the 
OECD. Figure 4.8 shows enormous differences between the two regions. With the 
exceptions of Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Suriname, all LAC countries have 
negative values in the CCI.  
   
5. Income distribution and institutions   
As discussed in previous sections, there are several arguments suggesting a link 
between the income distribution and the development of certain institutions. In this 
section we provide some empirical evidence on these links.  
The literature points out that the income distribution may interact with both the broad 
base institutions of a country and its specific political institutions. More equal or less 
polarised economies with lower poverty rates are expected to be found in more 
democratic countries with better institutions. The second link is more subtle as it refers 
to specific formal institutions that regulate the political process of a country. At that 
level, the links with the income distribution are more complex and weaker, and hence 
more difficult to document in the data. For this reason, this section is mainly focused on 
the relationship between the income distribution and the broad-based institutions. We 
start by comparing LAC with the industrialised countries, and then focus the analysis on 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
5.1. Comparing LAC to the advanced countries 
 
In this section we compare LAC to a sample of industrialised countries. In that group 
we include most European countries plus Australia, Canada, Israel, Taiwan and the US.9 
For simplicity, we call that group Advanced Countries (AC).   
                                                 
9 In Europe the sample includes Belgium, Czeck Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and the UK. 
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Table 5.1 shows the (non-weighted) mean of the main indicators of income distribution 
and broad-based institutions in LAC and AC countries in the late 1990s. As income 
distribution measures we include the DER index of polarisation and the Gini coefficient 
of inequality.10 We include six measures of broad-base institutions discussed in section 
4: the Rule of Law index, the Voice and Accountability index, the Legal Structure 
index, the Government Effectiveness index, the Democracy index, and the Political 
Constraint index. Naturally, these measures are significantly correlated.11 However, the 
correlation is not perfect, so we include them all to check the results for robustness.  
The last column in table 5.1 records the difference in each variable between AC and 
LAC and indicates with a star whether that gap is statistically significant. LAC 
countries are more polarised and unequal than the advanced countries. The differences 
are not only statistically significant but economically large. A difference of 10 points in 
the DER or 20 points in the Gini are signs of dramatic differences in the income 
distributions between these two groups.   
The gaps are also significant in term of institutions. In all six measures considered the 
differences in favour of the advanced countries are positive and large. The strong 
process toward democratisation in Latin America in the last three decades has reduced 
the gap in some variables (e.g. the Democracy index and the Political Constraint index), 
although significant differences still persist.  
Income distribution and broad-based institutions measures are negatively correlated in 
the country data (table 5.2). Countries with high levels of income polarisation are more 
likely to be institutionally weak. The correlations seem statistically strong over the 
whole period (early 1990s to early 2000s) and in each sub period. When controlling for 
the level of per capita GDP (in PPP terms) most of the correlations remain significant, 
although the values become smaller. This evidence indicates (still at a very preliminary 
level) that although the level of development can account for much of the relationship 
between income polarisation and institutions, the link between these two variables may 
go beyond that.  
Figure 5.1 suggests that the correlations may be driven mainly by the differences 
between the two groups (LAC and AC). In all the scatterplots the cloud of observations 
for LAC is clearly differentiated from the AC set of points. To take that into account we 
run regressions of distributional measures on institutional indicators, controlling for 
(log) per capita GDP and a dummy for LAC. The results in table 5.3 indicate that the 
relationship between polarisation/inequality and broad-based institutions remains 
negative and significant.  
So far, the empirical analysis suggests a link between the shape of the income 
distribution and the strength of its institutions. The results however do not point out to a 
                                                 
10 We do not include poverty since poverty measures based on international standards are not usually 
available for developed countries. 
11 In fact, some aggregated indices even share some components. 
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particular dimension of the income distribution or to a particular characteristic of the 
institutional framework. Results for income polarisation and inequality are basically the 
same. The low number of observations and the high correlation between indicators 
make difficult to distinguish the potential different effects of the two dimensions of the 
income distribution.  
The same applies for most of the institutional indicators. The Rule of Law index, The 
Voice and Accountability index, the Legal Structure index, and the Government 
Effectiveness index are all closely related to the income distribution. The relationship 
seems somewhat weaker in the case of the Democracy index and the Political Constraint 
index. As discussed above, LAC countries have strongly moved forward toward 
institutionalised democracies, and in that respect they are not very different from the AC 
societies. However, they are still lagging behind in terms of the effective functioning 
and respect for the institutions governing their interactions.    
 
5.2. Distribution and institutions within LAC 
 
In this section we restrict the analysis to our sample of Latin American countries. That 
allows us to focus the study in the region, to reduce comparability problems, and to add 
poverty into the analysis. LAC can be divided into three regions: (i) Southern South 
America (SSA) that includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay,12 (ii) the 
Andean South America (ASA), including Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and 
Venezuela, and (iii) Central America (CA) that includes countries in that region plus 
Mexico and the Caribbean countries. Table 5.4 shows that the regions are not 
significantly different in terms of mean inequality and polarisation. In contrast, given 
that the level of GDP is significantly higher in SSA, poverty is also lower in that region 
compared to the rest of Latin America. All institutional indices are also significantly 
higher in SSA. The result of the comparison between CA and ASA depends on the 
indicator.  
Table 5.5 shows changes in the distributional and institutional indicators over the 1990s 
and early 2000s. There was not much action in the distribution when regional means are 
considered. On average, only the Andean countries became more polarised and unequal. 
However, as discussed in section 3 the quiet mean is in some cases the consequence of 
substantial changes in different directions within a region. This is for instance the case 
in SSA, where while polarisation increased in Argentina and Uruguay, it went down in 
Brazil and Chile (at least when measured by the DER 0.5). On average, poverty did not 
significantly changed in Southern South America, it went up in the Andean region and 
decreased a bit in Central America.  
                                                 
12 This is the region of the Mercosur.  
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On average changes in institutional variables were small. The results are not robust, as 
patterns in regional means change sign from one indicator to another. Only the Andean 
region appears to have suffered a clear process of weakening institutions.  
At the country level there seems to exist a close link between the income distribution 
and the institutional strength. The correlations in table 5.6 and the scatterplot in figure 
5.2 and 5.3 suggest that more polarised/unequal/poor countries are on average also 
those with weaker institutions. The correlations seem particularly strong with the Rule 
of Law index, the Voice and Accountability indicator, and the Government 
Effectiveness index. Poverty is also significantly negatively correlated to the 
Democracy index. Most of the correlations remain significant when controlling for per 
capita GDP, although the values are substantially reduced.  
 
Box 1: The Chilean particularism 
Chile is omitted in the scatterplot of figure 5.2 and in the correlations because it has 
particularly very high levels in the institutional indicators and in the 
polarisation/inequality indicators. This extreme combination goes against the negative 
relationship between these two variables that seems to be present in the rest of LAC. 
Two reasons can be argued to treat Chile as a special case. First, that country has 
experienced a very fast increase in the institutional indicators that contrast with the rest 
of the region. Chile was not significantly different from the rest of LAC three decades 
ago. The fast change in institutional strength captured by the statistics may affect 
growth (and hence poverty) relatively fast, but modify the income distribution slowly. 
The second reason has to do with a measurement problem that is exclusive of Chile. 
The household survey (CASEN) is adjusted to match National Accounts: in particular 
capital income is greatly expanded, inflating the measures of inequality and polarisation 
(but only slightly affecting poverty indicators). Although Chile is surely a very 
polarised/unequal country, the recorded level is likely overestimated compared to the 
rest of LAC, and then moves Chile away from the regression line in figure 5.2.  
 
There seems to be some relationship between the level of different dimensions of the 
income distribution and the level of some broad-based institutions indicators. The links 
become weaker or even vanish when considering changes over the last decade. The 
topic is relevant: have changes in the income distribution experienced by LAC countries 
since the early 1990s been associated to changes in their institutional situations? Figure 
5.4 and table 5.7 do not offer strong evidence for this hypothesis. Although in most 
cases the correlations have the expected sign (negative) they are non-significant.  
Poverty is the only distributional variable for which some of the institutional variables 
are significant in a panel data regression (see table 5.8). When considering polarisation 
or inequality as the left-hand-side variables the coefficients of the institutional variables 
are significant in a cross-section regression, but non-significant when controlling for 
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fixed effects. In contrast, the coefficients remain significant when using poverty as the 
left-hand-side variable.  
Table 5.8 shows the regression when controlling for per capita GDP (at PPP). We also 
run regressions with several other controls: social spending, spending in education and 
health, indices of reforms, indices of trade liberalisation, and terms of trade. The basic 
results remain unchanged. We do not include all the controls together because of low 
degrees of freedom.  
Summing up, poverty is the only distributional dimension for which the negative link 
with institutions holds when considering changes. This result makes sense. An 
improvement in the institutional environment may be quickly translated into a better 
business climate and better conditions for investments, which in turn may foster 
economic growth, which implies lower poverty given a stable income distribution. 
While some Latin American countries seemed to have experienced this virtuous process 
(Chile and some Central American countries are the main examples), some others have 
suffered a similar process but with the opposite sign: Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay 
and Venezuela are the main examples. Although the income distribution may quickly 
translate horizontally, reducing or increasing poverty, the shape of the distribution is 
much more difficult to transform. To say it in a more colloquial way: an improvement 
in the institutional setting may serve to increase the size of the cake relatively fast, but it 
takes time to change the way it is divided among the population. Both the income 
distribution and the broad-based institutions change slowly over time, so it is reasonable 
that we cannot capture a clear pattern of association in a short period of time with noisy 
measures. 
 
Box 2: Malapportionment 
As stated above, the relationship between the income distribution and the specific 
political institutions is more subtle and hence more difficult to analyze empirically. In 
this box we comment the results of studying the case of malapportionment. The 
literature has recently stressed legislative malapportionment as a measure of inequality 
in representation.13 Malapportionment means a discrepancy between the shares of 
legislative seats and the shares of population held by electoral districts, and implies a 
failure in the golden rule “one person-one vote”. A score of x% in the malapportionment 
index (MI) means that x% of seats are allocated to districts that would not receive those 
seats in case of perfect apportionment. Samuels and Snyder (2001) show that the MI is 
significantly higher in LAC than in the rest of the world, even when controlling for 
other institutional variables. In our sample the MI index is 0.08 for LAC and 0.03 in the 
advanced countries (the difference is statistically significant at 1%).  
                                                 
13 See for instance Samuels and Snyder (2001). 
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The linear correlation between the DER measure of income polarisation and the MI 
index is positive and significant (0.61) when using the extended sample of LAC and AC 
countries. The relationship holds when controlling for GDP and when including a 
dummy for LAC in a regression. When restricting the analysis to the sample of LAC 
countries the positive relationship between malapportionment and 
polarisation/inequality/poverty remains. Countries that violate the golden rule “one 
person-one vote” are those where the political process tend to favour pivotal voters, 
which could translate into a more unequal/polarised distribution, and given a level of 
national income, also into higher poverty.   
 
6. Income distribution, conflict and corruption  
In this section we turn to the relationship between conflict and income distribution. As 
discussed above the available data does not allow disentangling causal relationships. 
However, in most of the discussions in this section we implicitly tend to view conflicts 
as caused, among other factors, by different dimensions of the income distribution. We 
also briefly examine in this section the potential relationship between the income 
distribution and corruption.   
In order to capture the level of conflict in the society we use the Political Stability and 
Absence of Conflict Index (PSAVI) (also named General Conflict indicator). This 
indicator, introduced in section 4, is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding to a system which is least likely destabilised or 
overthrown, and where conflict plays a minor role. We also use the Labour Standard 
Index (LSI) discussed in section 4. This index is measured in units ranging from 0 to 
76.5, with higher values corresponding to less respect for the worker’s rights. We 
expect to find high values of the LSI in highly polarised/unequal societies. To measure 
corruption we use the Control of Corruption Index (CCI). This index is measured in 
units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to less corruption.  
 
6.1. LAC and the advanced countries  
 
As discussed in section 4 LAC and AC countries are substantially different in terms of 
conflicts and corruption. Table 6.1 shows the average values for the PSAVI and the 
CCI. The differences in means between the two groups in both variables are clearly 
significant. In table 6.2 we show simple and partial correlations between income 
distribution, and conflict/corruption variables. Countries where polarisation and 
inequality are high tend to be those with high levels of conflict and corruption.14 Even 
when we control for GDP per capita the correlations remain significant. Figure 6.1 
                                                 
14 Notice that the variables measure the control of conflict and corruption, so the correlations with the 
income distribution measures are negative 
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suggests that observations from LAC and from AC countries are far from each other. 
The advanced countries are almost all located at the bottom right of the figure, 
indicating low levels of both conflict and polarisation. It is remarkable how 
homogeneous these countries are compared to LAC. When running a regression with a 
LAC dummy both income distribution indicators remain significant.  
Corruption is also correlated to income distribution (table 6.2). Figure 6.1 shows a 
somewhat different pattern than for the case of the General Conflict Index. Now the 
advanced countries are more dispersed and the LAC countries are more homogeneous. 
Despite the fact that the advanced countries have low levels of polarisation, some of 
them still have serious problems of corruption. 
 
6.2 Distribution, conflict and corruption within LAC   
 
In this section we restrict the analysis to our sample of LAC countries. Table 6.4 
illustrates that, as with the institutional variables, there are significant differences across 
regions within LAC. Southern South America has lower levels of conflict (measured by 
both the PSAVI and the LSI) and corruption than the rest of LAC. Table 6.5 shows 
changes in the conflict and corruption indicators over the 1990s and early 2000s. On 
average, changes in the General Conflict Index were small for the SSA, but 
considerable in the ASA and CA. This does not mean that for all the countries in the  
SSA region there has been no change, but instead that some countries (e.g. Chile) have 
experienced improvements while others (e.g. Argentina) have suffered an increase in 
the level of conflictivity. The Andean region appears to have experienced a process of  
escalating conflict and instability, which translated into a loss of almost 1/3 of a point in 
the General Conflict Index. Central America, on the other hand, moved up 0.35 points 
in the scale.  
Regarding the Control of Corruption Index, on average the SSA region is the one that 
improved the most, with again different paths across the countries of that region. The 
ASA experienced a similar pattern with a positive overall mean.  
The correlations in table 6.6 and the scatterplots in figure 6.2 and 6.3 suggest that more 
polarised/unequal/poor countries are on average also those with higher levels of 
conflicts (both general and labour conflict). The correlations with the General Conflict 
index remain significant when controlling for per capita GDP.15 In fact, the values are 
almost unchanged when including controls. The correlations with the measures of 
control of corruption have the expected sign (negative), although the relationships do 
not seem strong, in particular when we control for other variables.  
                                                 
15 Colombia  is omitted in the scatterplot of figure 6.3 and in the correlations because it has very high 
levels in the general conflict index for very particular reasons that we cannot control for. 
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Table 6.7 and figure 6.4 show that some of the links become weaker or even vanish 
when considering changes over the last decade. However correlations between changes 
in the General Conflict Index and changes in inequality and poverty remain significant.  
Table 6.8 shows the results of panel regressions where we control for fixed effects. 
Changes in polarisation, inequality and poverty seem to be related to changes in 
conflict. This piece of evidence is consistent with the idea that increasing levels of 
polarisation, inequality and poverty generate a hostile atmosphere within the society 
that could imply higher levels of social conflict and political instability. The relationship 
with corruption, instead, is not clear.  
In what follows we include a set of institutional controls to the analysis. It has long been 
argued that institutions are key features to understand social conflicts. This was the 
main argument in Thomas Hobbes’s famous Leviathan where he asserts that without a 
powerful State conflict between people were unavoidable. Nowadays a vast majority of 
the academic field agrees that a State needs to set the “rule of the game” as clear as 
possible in order to avoid conflict and instability.  
Table 6.9 illustrates the high correlations between institutions and conflict in the LAC 
context. Countries which succeed in developing an environment in which fair and 
predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions are those with less 
conflict and corruption. One interesting finding is that the variable that measures the 
degree of institutionalized democracy is not significantly correlated with the control of 
corruption. This could be due to the fact that institutionalized democracy is related to 
some institutional process, like for example voting, but it does not take into account the 
informal constrains that shape the way democracy actually works. Democracy in LAC 
is today much more common than what it used to be, and without any doubt this was an 
enormous step forward for the region. But having to vote every now and then, having a 
constitution that protect freedom and private property, and having a constitutional 
separation of powers does not mean that democracy is working as it should.  
The regression results for the General Conflict index when institutions are included in 
the analysis are shown in table 6.10. In the right hand side we include income 
distribution measures, along with institutional indicators and other controls (basically 
GDP per capita, although we tried with several variables).   
The results suggest that both polarisation and inequality are closely related to situations 
of conflict. The measures of these distributional dimensions are always significant when 
controlling for different institutional measures. That is not the case with the poverty 
headcount ratio: coefficients have the expected signs but seem to be non-significant.  
The results of the regressions suggest that both income distribution and institutions do 
matter for social conflict and instability. Polarisation and inequality seem to be the 
relevant dimensions of the income distribution, while the RLI and the VAI seem to 
better capture the formal and informal institutions more closely linked to conflict and 
instability. These links are not strong when using a more specific labour conflict index.  
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The income distribution coefficients are non-significant for the Control of Corruption 
Index. The Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness Index are the only significant 
institutional variables in the regressions. This means that the quality of the bureaucracy, 
the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies (GEI) are 
correlated with the degree of corruption even after controlling for the level of economic 
development and the level of income distribution.  
 
Box 3: Trust and political views: evidence from the World Values Survey  
The shape of the income distribution surely interacts with the views and values of a 
society. In this box we briefly analyse this issue by using the World Value Survey 
(henceforth, WVS). This survey is a worldwide investigation of basic values and beliefs 
carried out in more than 80 countries.16 We use data for 77 countries taken mostly from 
the 1999–2000 round of the survey.17 Table B.1 shows mean values for LAC, the Rest 
of the World (RW), and a set of Advanced countries (AC).  
The concept of social cohesion is related to that of trust. Social cohesion implies the 
sharing of common values and the respect for each other. The first row in Table B.1 
records the mean across countries of the share of individuals that respond that in their 
countries “most people can be trusted”. The difference between LAC and the rest of the 
world is noticeable. On average, only 17%t of people in LAC answer this question 
positively, in contrast to 30% in RW and 37% in AC.  
The share of people that strongly agrees with the statement that “democracy is the best 
form of government” is higher in LAC than in the rest of the world, and similar than in 
the advanced countries. Compared to this group more people in LAC believe that “the 
country is run by a few big interests” and that “the entire way our society is organized 
must be radically changed by revolutionary action”. However, there are large 
differences in the acceptance of these two propositions. While on average 70% of the 
population believes that governments are “captured” by a few groups, only 9% seems to 
approve revolutionary actions.  
                                                 
16 The WVS has given rise to more than 300 publications, in 16 languages. The project is being carried 
out by an international network of social scientists. Coordination and distribution of data are based at the 
Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan.  
17 The countries in the sample are: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Armenia, 
Belgium, Bosnia and Hezegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Belarus, Canada, Chile, China, Taiwan (province of 
China), Colombia, Croatia, Czechrep, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Italy, 
Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Moldavia, Morocco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, Ukraine, Republic of 
Macedonia, Egypt, Great Britain, Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Serbia y 
Montenegro. 
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Income inequality and trust are negatively correlated in the country data (table B.2). 
When controlling for the level of per capita GDP, and for the percentage of unskilled 
people in each country the correlation remains significant. There is a weak negative 
correlation between income inequality and the support to democracy as the best form of 
government. Finally, higher levels of income inequality seem to be related to the 
acceptance of radical actions. 
Figure B.1 shows the scatterplots of these relationships. It is interesting to notice that 
given their levels of inequality, LAC countries are in general more prone to accept 
democracy and to avoid revolutionary changes. Table B.3 shows that income inequality 
is associated to less confidence in democracy and more acceptance of radical changes, 
even after controlling for the level of economic development and a LAC dummy.  
The signs of these dummies confirm the higher acceptance of democracy in LAC 
(controlling for the level of GDP and inequality). That characteristic could be due to the 
process of learning that these countries had gone through years of painful dictatorial 
regimes.   
 
7. Concluding remarks  
This document explores the relationship between income distribution, institutions and 
conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean by using a new database of income 
distribution statistics. As it is well known in the cross-country literature, the evidence is 
mostly limited to correlations between variables, rather than causal relationships. 
Nonetheless, we put forward a set of hypothesis consistent with the empirical results of 
the paper.  
Countries that are institutionally weak are more likely to have high levels of income 
disparities. This result is robust to different measures of polarisation and inequality, and 
holds even when controlling for GDP and other variables.  
In contrast, we could not find a robust association between changes in the income 
distribution and changes in various broad-based institutions in LAC over the last 
decade.  
Poverty is the only variable for which the negative link with institutions holds when 
considering changes since the early 1990s. We argue that improvements in the 
institutional environment quickly foster investments and economic growth, which in 
turn contribute to lowering poverty, but better institutions cannot be easily translated 
into equalizing changes in the income distribution.  
Countries with high income polarisation and inequality are more likely to have high 
levels of conflict and corruption. These distributional dimensions are always significant 
“determinants” of the degree of conflict, even when controlling for different 
institutional measures and GDP. Instead, changes in poverty do not seem to be closely 
associated to higher conflictivity.  
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In summary, the paper suggests that institutions and conflict interact in different ways 
with the various characteristics of the income distribution. There is some evidence that 
in the LAC context institutional development has been associated to lower poverty, but 
not significantly lower inequality and polarisation. Instead, conflicts seem more related 
to inequality and polarisation than to income poverty.  
Income disparities are associated to a lower sense of trust, less confidence in democracy 
and more acceptance of radical changes. Since inequities are relatively high in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the region seems more prone to situations of political 
instability, social tension and conflict. However, on the other hand, when controlling for 
inequality LAC countries seem to have a higher acceptance of democracy, a fact that 
could be due to the process of learning that these countries had gone through years of 
painful dictatorial regimes.   
Some LAC countries (e.g. Chile and some Central American economies) seem to have 
followed a virtuous path of stronger institutions, sustainable growth, and lower poverty. 
However, very few countries have managed to reduce income polarisation/inequality.  
In that scenario, situations of conflict, social tension and instability are always latent.  
Another group of LAC countries have suffered a cycle of institutional and economic 
setbacks (e.g. Argentina and Venezuela). The combination of weaker institutions with 
larger inequalities quickly translated into situations of social tension and conflict.  
Fortunately, most LAC countries are now in a stage of economic growth. Governments 
should take advantage of this opportunity to take concrete steps toward reducing 
inequities. There are many reasons why some income redistribution is socially 
desirable. The results of this paper highlight the role of a more equitable distribution in 
reducing the probability of social tension and conflicts.  
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 Annex  
 
Indicators of institutions, conflict and corruption18
 
CCI: Control of Corruption  Index. The index is a measure of perceptions of corruption,  
defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. It is measured in units ranging 
from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to less corruption. Source: 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999). 
DI: Democracy Index. The index is a measure of the degree of institutionalized 
democracy as opposed to institutionalize autocracy based on conceived democracy as 
three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative 
policies and leaders. The second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive. The third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all 
citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The index is measured 
in units ranging from -10 to 10, with higher values corresponding to a system with a 
more consolidate democracy.  Source:  Polity IV Project. 
DNW: Days Not Work index. This index measures the number of days not worked as a 
result of strikes and lockouts. This is usually measured in terms of the sum of the actual 
working days during which work would normally have been carried out by each worker 
involved had there been no stoppage. Source: ILO (International Labour Organization) 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (2005). 
ECI: Executive Constraints Index. The index is a measure of the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether 
individuals or collectives. Source:  Polity IV Project. 
ECIWB: Executive Constraints Index. This index refers to the extent of 
institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. Source: 
World Bank (Database of Political Institutions) (2002). 
EDI: Electoral Democracy Index. This index is an aggregation of four indicators: right 
to vote, clean elections, free election and elected public officials. Source: Democracy in 
Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy. United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (2004). 
                                                 
18 For a complete description of each variable refer to the Statistical Compendium. 
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EF: Ethnic Fractionalization’s index. This index measure how fractionalize is a given 
country in terms of  its different ethnic groups. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly and Kurlat (2003). 
FREEDOM: Complains Presented Before the Union Freedom Committee. This index 
measures the number of complains presented before the union freedom committee. This 
is a cumulative index, which means that if, for example, in Bolivia the first complain in 
the decade occurs in 1990 and then another in 1991, the index for 1990 will be one and 
for 1991 will be two, reflecting both complains. Source: ILO (International Labour 
Organization) Yearbook of Labour Statistics. (2005). 
FTI: Freedom to Trade Internationally index. This index is a measure of the possibility 
to engage in international trade in a country. It consists in an aggregation of indexes 
which try to capture the taxes on international trade, regulatory trade barriers, 
differences between official exchange rate and black market rate, international capital 
market controls, etc. Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005). 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (PPP). Source: Internationally Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
GEI: Government Effectiveness Index. The index is a measure of the quality of public 
service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies.  It is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values corresponding to a more effective government. Source: Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). 
IED: Index of Electoral Disproportionality. This index is a measure of the deviation of 
party’s seat shares from their vote shares. The measure of disproportionality, for the 
lower house or single chamber of parliament, is the least-squares index (LSq), which is 
calculated by squaring the vote-seat share difference for each party, adding all these 
figures, dividing the total by two, and finally taking the square root of the resulting 
value. Lower numbers can be interpreted as a sign that parties receive a number of seats 
that is closely proportional to their number of votes, while higher numbers indicate that 
the relationship between parties' votes and seats is more disproportional. Source: United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2004). Democracy in Latin America: 
Towards a Citizens’ Democracy. 
IENP: Index of Effective Number of Parties (based on percentage of votes). The 
effective number of parties-votes is a measure of the fragmentation of voters' 
preferences among parties. This index is calculated using Laakso and Taagapera's 
(1979) formula, that is, by squaring each party’s fractional share of votes, summing the 
results and then dividing 1 by this value. Source: United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (2004). Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ 
Democracy. 
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IER: Index of Economic Reforms. The index of economic reforms consists of five 
components: trade reform, tax reform, financial liberalization of privatization, and 
liberalization of external capital transaction. This index tries to capture the complex 
wave of economics reform that went on in Latin America & Caribbean during the past 
decade. The scale goes from 0.000 to 1.000, the higher the score indicating a greater 
degree of market orientation in the economic reforms. Sources: Morley, Machado and 
Pettinato (1999), Lora (2001) and CEPAL (2003). 
LCM: Lower-Chamber Malapportionment. This index measures the degree in which 
one vote is equally weight across a given country. It tries to capture the idea that one of 
the cornerstones of democracy involves that every vote should count exactly the same 
independent of who is casting the vote. The index, which is computed using Snyder and 
Samuels' formula, reflects how far are the countries from the “ideal” democracy where 
the rule “every vote should we weighted equally” is respected. Source: Snyder and 
Samuels (2001).   
LF: Language Fractionalization’s index. This index measure how fractionalize is a 
given country in terms of  language. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and 
Kurlat (2003). 
LS: Labour Standards index. The index is a composed measure of the worker’s freedom 
to organize themselves, negotiate collectively and to be declared in strike. This index 
covers a variety of rights violated, but does not measure the frequency of its violation 
neither the quantity of workers affected by such violations. The index is measured in 
units ranging from 0 to 76.5, with higher values corresponding to less respect for the 
worker’s rights. Source: Mosley and Uno (2002). 
LSI: Legal Structure and security of property rights index. This index is a measure of 
the functioning’s of the legal system in a country. Consist in an aggregation of indexes  
which try to capture the degree of judicial independence, the court’s impartibility, the 
military interference in rule of law and in the political process, etc. It is measured in 
units ranging from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to a system with a better 
working of the legal system. Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005). 
PCI: Political Constraints Index. This index estimates the feasibility of policy change 
(the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change 
in government policy). The index is measured in units ranging from 0 to 1, with higher 
values corresponding to a system where policy changes are more feasible. Source: 
Henisz, W. J. (2006). 
PEE: Public Expenditures in Education. Expenditures in education as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product. Source: CEPAL. (2002) 
PEH: Public Expenditures in Health. Expenditures in health as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product. Source: CEPAL (2002). 
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PF: Press Freedom index. The index is a composite measure of legal, political, and 
economic constraints on the freedom of the press generated by Freedom House. Source: 
Compiled by Gerardo Munck  (UNDP). 
PI: Particularism Index. The index is a measure of the degree in which candidates for 
public office need to differentiate them from his party leaders in order to lift their 
chances of winning the election. Seddon, Gaviria, Panizza and Stein  (2002). 
PSAVI: Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index. The index is a measure 
which try to capture the idea that the quality of governance in a country is compromised 
by the likelihood of wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct 
effect on the continuity of policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of 
all citizens to peacefully select and replace those in power. This index combine several 
indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power 
will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism. It is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 
2.5, with higher values corresponding to a system which is least likely destabilized or 
overthrown and where conflict plays no part in the society. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2005) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). 
RDH: Rate of Deceitful Homicide index. This index measures the number of homicides 
by each 100.000 inhabitants. Sources: Interpol (2004), UNODC (2002); Krug (2002: 
274, 308-12); and United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (2001, 2002).  
RDI: Regime Durability Index. The index is a measure of the number of years since the 
most recent regime change or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable 
political institutions. Source:  Polity IV Project. 
RDIWB: Regime Durability Index. This index refers to how long the country has been 
autocratic or democratic. Source: World Bank (Database of Political Institutions) 
(2002). 
REGCLBI: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business Index. This index is a measure 
of the regulatory policy’s quality carried out in a country. Consist in an aggregation of 
indexes which try to capture the degree of competition in the bank industry, of interest 
rate controls, the percentage of credit extended to private sector, the hiring and firing 
practices, the price controls, etc. Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005). 
RF: Religion Fractionalization’s index. This index measures how fractionalize is a 
given country in terms of religion. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and 
Kurlat (2003). 
RLI: Rule of Law Index. The index is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding, in broad terms, to the respect of citizens and the state for 
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the institutions which govern their interactions. This index includes several indicators 
which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, these 
indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair 
and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions, and 
importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2005) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). 
RQI: Regulatory Quality Index. The index is a measure of the effective regulatory 
policy. It includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price 
controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed 
by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999). 
SAL: Strike and Lockout index. This index measures the quantity of strikes and 
lockouts in a given country. A strike is a temporary work stoppage by one or more 
groups of workers with a view to enforcing or resisting demands or expressing 
grievances, or supporting other workers in their demands or grievances. A lockout is a 
total or partial temporary closure of one or more places of employment, or the hindering 
of the normal work activities of employees, by one or more employers with a view to 
enforcing or resisting demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other employers 
in their demands or grievances. Source: ILO (International Labour Organization) 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (2005). 
VAI: Voice and Accountability  Index. The index is a measure of the extent to which 
citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. It includes a 
number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties 
and political rights. It also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media. 
The index is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to a system where the citizenship has more voice and accountability. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999). 
VAJ: Violence Against Journalists index.  For 1990 and 1991, the measure records the 
number of confirmed and unconfirmed cases of journalists killed in the line of duty for a 
given country, either in direct reprisal for their work or in cross fire. From 1992 
onwards, the measure records only the number of clearly confirmed cases of journalists 
killed in the line of duty, either in direct reprisal for their work or in cross fire. This is a 
cumulative index Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Compiled 
by Gerardo Munck. 
VVRAP: Valid Votes Relative to Voting Age Population. This variable measure the 
percentage of valid votes relative to the voting age population (VVRAP). VVRAP 
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estimates are based on population data for those 18 years and older. The data refers to 
legislative elections for the lower house or single chamber or to first round presidential 
elections. Source: Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2004).   
WR: Woman’s Representation in the legislative chamber. Measure of  the percentage of 
women in the legislative chamber. Source: PIU  (1995, 2003). Compiled by Gerardo 
Munck. 
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Table 3.1 
Household surveys used in the study 
Country Name of survey Acronym Years Coverage
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1992-2003 Urban 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua EPH-C 2003-2004 Urban 
Bolivia Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1993 Urban
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo ENE 1997 National
Encuesta Continua de Hogares- MECOVI ECH 2000-2002 National
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 1990-2003 National
Chile Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional CASEN 1990-2003 National
Colombia Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo ENH-FT 1992 Urban
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo ENH-FT 1996-2000 National
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2000-2004 National
Encuesta de Calidad de Vida ECV 2003 National
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1992-2003 National
Dominican R. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 1996-2004 National
Ecuador Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida ECV 1994-1998 National
Encuesta de Empleo, Desemple y Subempleo ENEMDU 2003 National
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 1991-2003 National
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida ENCOVI 2000 National
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos ENEI - 2 2002 National
Haiti Enquête sur les Conditions de Vie en Haïti ECVH 2001 National
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EPHPM 1992-2003 National
Jamaica Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions JSLC 1990-2002 National
Mexico Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH 1992-2002 National
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida EMNV 1993-2001 National
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 1995-2003 National
Paraguay Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1997 National
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1999-2003 National
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 2001 National
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 1997-2003 National
Suriname Expenditure Household Survey EHS 1999 Urban/Paramaribo
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1989-2004 Urban
Venezuela  Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1989-2003 National  
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Table 3.2 
Indicators of income polarisation, inequality and poverty 
Distribution of household per capita income 
                Pure income polarisation                      Income inequality   Income poverty (USD 2 a day)
Wolfson EGR (3) DER (0.5) DER (0.75) Gini Theil A(1) A(2) FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2)
Argentina (*)
1992 0.413 0.734 0.289 0.274 0.450 0.370 0.297 0.507 4.8 2.1 1.5
1998 0.488     0.808     0.300     0.274     0.502 0.472 0.368 0.605 9.4 3.9 2.5
2004 0.500     0.828     0.298     0.268     0.506 0.499 0.379 0.624 14.1 6.0 3.7
Bolivia (**)
1993 0.530     0.926     0.324     0.290     0.583     0.784     0.499     0.777     60.1 34.0 25.1
1997 0.552     0.945     0.331     0.297     0.580 0.697 0.497 0.792 36.2 18.5 12.6
2002 0.578     0.982     0.342     0.314     0.601 0.735 0.557 0.912 43.1 23.9 17.3
Brazil
1990 0.648     0.998     0.363     0.344     0.604 0.746 0.500 0.777 28.8 12.7 7.7
1998 0.607     0.977     0.356     0.350     0.592 0.713 0.481 0.715 19.4 9.1 6.0
2003 0.569     0.949     0.344     0.346     0.576 0.668 0.465 0.725 20.2 9.4 6.4
Chile
1990 0.501     0.908     0.319     0.289     0.551 0.648 0.420 0.667 14.4 4.8 2.5
1998 0.518     0.912     0.318     0.289     0.555 0.645 0.423 0.656 6.5 2.2 1.2
2003 0.476     0.888     0.312     0.283     0.546 0.662 0.410 0.631 5.1 1.8 1.0
Colombia (*)
1992 0.411     0.802     0.292     0.277     0.487     0.502     0.329     0.489     9.5 5.5 4.8
2000 0.492     0.911     0.323     0.307     0.553 0.676 0.428 0.681 17.5 11.2 9.6
2004 0.518     0.905     0.321     0.299     0.553 0.623 0.434 0.711 21.7 12.8 10.3
Costa Rica
1992 0.406     0.715     0.262     0.223     0.446 0.369 0.307 0.564 12.8 6.1 4.3
1997 0.412     0.725     0.260     0.221     0.449 0.367 0.305 0.543 8.5 4.0 2.7
2003 0.464     0.794     0.278     0.241     0.490 0.452 0.358 0.616 8.8 4.3 3.0
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.494     0.853     0.297     0.262     0.520 0.532 0.387 0.625 8.8 3.2 1.6
2004 0.464     0.841     0.295     0.263     0.514 0.543 0.373 0.584 16.4 5.2 2.5
Ecuador
1994 0.468     0.873     0.305     0.267     0.538 0.607 0.428 0.752 36.2 16.4 10.4
1998 0.497     0.905     0.310     0.275     0.534 0.552 0.435 0.804 39.1 18.7 12.4
2003 0.464     0.839     0.293     0.258     0.518 0.547 0.390 0.646 36.3 15.7 9.5
El Salvador
1991 0.481     0.853     0.297     0.260     0.527 0.567 0.414 0.746 49.7 24.5 16.2
2000 0.491     0.844     0.295     0.252     0.519 0.531 0.422 0.785 39.7 19.9 13.5
2003 0.472     0.822     0.286     0.244     0.509 0.503 0.411 0.779 39.1 19.1 12.8
Guatemala
2000 0.480     0.890     0.309     0.276     0.549 0.604 0.435 0.713 29.7 11.8 6.6
Haiti 
2001 0.558     0.973     0.334     0.300     0.592 0.746 0.495 0.768 78.0 47.4 33.6
Honduras (***)
1992 0.494     0.836     0.295     0.258     0.515 0.524 0.382 0.643 33.9 12.6 6.4
1997 0.476     0.852     0.300     0.263     0.526 0.585 0.399 0.681 32.6 13.7 7.9
2003 0.515     0.883     0.315     0.281     0.538 0.588 0.407 0.631 37.4 16.0 9.2
Jamaica
1990 0.639     0.924     0.311     0.260     0.574 0.638 0.514 0.841 58.7 39.7 33.0
1999 0.626     0.961     0.334     0.308     0.551 0.626 0.482 0.850 35.2 22.0 17.6
2002 0.610     0.974     0.345     0.316     0.599 0.729 0.575 0.932 44.6 32.3 27.7
Mexico
1992 0.478     0.894     0.308     0.276     0.555 0.687 0.436 0.718 26.8 12.4 8.1
1996 0.474     0.856     0.297     0.264     0.540 0.663 0.417 0.705 37.3 18.4 12.7
2002 0.467     0.834     0.290     0.256     0.506 0.500 0.383 0.703 25.1 11.7 8.0
Nicaragua
1993 0.548     0.919     0.318     0.281     0.565 0.653 0.465 0.754 61.6 33.7 23.1
1998 0.475     0.876     0.308     0.271     0.540 0.628 0.422 0.701 52.2 24.7 15.3
2001 0.478     0.886     0.310     0.279     0.543 0.698 0.416 0.662 48.4 20.6 11.9
Panama
1995 0.545     0.900     0.306     0.262     0.551 0.576 0.459 0.783 20.5 13.0 10.5
2003 0.572     0.922     0.321     0.285     0.561 0.607 0.455 0.723 16.9 7.3 4.3
Paraguay
1997 0.557     0.920     0.319     0.281     0.564 0.620 0.481 0.805 30.3 18.7 14.8
2002 0.557     0.927     0.318     0.281     0.571 0.713 0.481 0.798 34.8 17.2 11.3
Peru
1997 0.514     0.871     0.306     0.267     0.537 0.581 0.422 0.675 32.2 14.2 8.4
2002 0.502     0.885     0.312     0.274     0.546 0.636 0.423 0.650 32.0 13.5 7.6
Suriname (*)
1999 0.493     0.849     0.291     0.244     0.528 0.534 0.419 0.882 35.8 22.1 17.4
Uruguay (*)
1989 0.366     0.680     0.252     0.217     0.424 0.354 0.271 0.468 2.7 0.7 0.3
1998 0.401     0.709     0.257     0.218     0.440 0.344 0.294 0.541 3.4 1.1 0.6
2003 0.418     0.728     0.265     0.230     0.449 0.367 0.294 0.614 4.9 1.4 0.6
Venezuela
1989 0.376     0.683     0.265     0.243     0.425 0.335 0.274 0.485 18.5 7.7 4.9
1998 0.433     0.762     0.272     0.233     0.472 0.415 0.338 0.606 28.0 11.9 7.3
2000 0.408     0.709     0.259     0.222     0.441 0.357 0.297 0.535 30.8 12.7 7.5
2003 0.430     0.745     0.267     0.229     0.462 0.395 0.326 0.590 44.5 20.8 13.4  
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
(*) Urban estimates. In Argentina,1992 figures estimated by extrapolating results from a smaller sample of cities.  
(**) 1993 figures estimated by extrapolating result for urban areas 
(***) 1992 figures estimated by extrapolating results of the EPH 92 that covered only labour incomes.  
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Table 3.3 
Indicators of income polarisation and inequality 
Distribution of earnings  
                Pure income polarisation Earnings inequality (Gini)
Wolfson EGR (3) DER (0.5) DER (0.75) All Urban monetary 
Argentina (*)
1992 0.355          0.638          0.283          0.260          0.396 0.396
1998 0.392       0.739       0.276       0.239       0.461 0.461
2004 0.470 0.470
Bolivia (**)
1993 0.472       0.926       0.342       0.336       0.568 0.534
1997 0.497       0.924       0.342       0.328       0.568 0.534
2002 0.507       0.930       0.323       0.295       0.571 0.551
Brazil
1990 0.626       0.988       0.486       0.620       0.597 0.592
1998 0.543       0.943       0.506       0.675       0.571 0.564
2003 0.494       0.906       0.536       0.797       0.552 0.548
Chile
1990 0.429       0.884       0.363       0.394       0.536 0.526
1998 0.459       0.906       0.381       0.421       0.554 0.547
2003 0.452       0.887       0.389       0.441       0.546 0.542
Colombia (*)
1992 0.340          0.721          0.312          0.287          0.451 0.464
2000 0.347          0.799          0.379          0.449          0.504 0.519
2004 0.353          0.816          0.377          0.436          0.504 0.513
Costa Rica
1992 0.313          0.640          0.245          0.218          0.404 0.412
1997 0.346          0.677          0.246          0.208          0.423 0.422
2003 0.371          0.729          0.276          0.247          0.454 0.456
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.441          0.814          0.293          0.258          0.499 0.503
2004 0.450          0.778          0.281          0.243          0.479 0.493
Ecuador
1994 0.463          0.880          0.302          0.274          
1998 0.468          0.883          0.309          0.277          
2003 0.404          0.785          0.320          0.332          0.491 0.498
El Salvador
1991 0.385          0.774          0.301          0.294          0.486 0.482
2000 0.403          0.752          0.282          0.256          0.470 0.477
2003 0.408          0.791          0.291          0.266          0.496 0.468
Guatemala
2000 0.504          0.919          0.330          0.298          0.572 0.580
Haiti 
2001 0.907          1.143          0.431          0.445          0.682 0.712
Honduras (***)
1992 0.428          0.794          0.284          0.259          0.503 0.496
1997 0.449          0.845          0.302          0.281          0.524 0.515
2003 0.494          0.846          0.304          0.272          0.524 0.527
Jamaica
1990 0.317          0.656          0.253          0.227          0.413 0.408
1999 0.249          0.650          0.257          0.241          0.395 0.432
2002 0.339          0.710          0.266          0.241          0.444 0.476
Mexico
1992 0.437          0.878          0.316          0.308          0.547 0.523
1996 0.466          0.844          0.305          0.292          0.538 0.510
2002 0.446          0.813          0.311          0.309          0.528 0.457
Nicaragua
1993 0.524          0.891          0.318          0.284          0.551 0.498
1998 0.477          0.914          0.313          0.278          0.565 0.558
2001 0.493          0.949          0.325          0.296          0.586 0.577
Panama
1995 0.420          0.786          0.283          0.240          0.488 0.483
2003 0.428          0.852          0.338          0.340          0.529 0.490
Paraguay
1997 0.414          0.827          0.301          0.270          0.511 0.496
2002 0.478          0.863          0.300          0.269          0.560 0.519
Peru
1997 0.441          0.821          0.292          0.255          0.510 0.510
2002 0.479          0.911          0.312          0.278          0.559 0.558
Suriname (*)
1999 0.341          0.716          0.264          0.238          0.446 0.446
Uruguay (*)
1989 0.373          0.702          0.251          0.212          0.450 0.464
1998 0.409          0.747          0.266          0.226          0.463 0.482
2003 0.431          0.796          0.283          0.249          0.494 0.511
Venezuela
1989 0.298          0.628          0.394          0.535          0.398 0.386
1998 0.369          0.705          0.286          0.275          0.443 0.446
2000 0.301          0.641          0.297          0.308          0.403 0.398
2003 0.344          0.676          0.286          0.278          0.425 0.378  
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC.  
(*) Urban estimates. In Argentina,1992 figures estimated by extrapolating results from a smaller sample of cities.  
(**) 1993 figures estimated by extrapolating result for urban areas 
(***) 1992 figures estimated by extrapolating results of the EPH 92 that covered only labour incomes.  
 
 34
Table 3.4 
Correlations between polarisation, inequality and poverty measures  
                Pure income polarisation                          Income inequality  Income poverty (USD 2 a day              Earnings
Wolfson EGR 3 DER 0.5 DER 0.75 Gini Theil A(1) A(2) FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) DER (0.5) Gini
wolfson 1.0000
egr3 0.9092* 1.0000
der05 0.9159* 0.9774* 1.0000
der075 0.8443* 0.9017* 0.9647* 1.0000
gini 0.9041* 0.9966* 0.9672* 0.8811* 1.0000
theil 0.7991* 0.9563* 0.9220* 0.8383* 0.9611* 1.0000
A(1) 0.9217* 0.9391* 0.9063* 0.8014* 0.9523* 0.8795* 1.0000
A(2) 0.7057* 0.6426* 0.5760* 0.4514* 0.6741* 0.5563* 0.8244* 1.0000
FGT(0) 0.3425 0.4246 0.3463 0.2153 0.4408* 0.4679* 0.4860* 0.4521* 1.0000
FGT(1) 0.4672* 0.4993* 0.4267 0.2906 0.5175* 0.5073* 0.5954* 0.5997* 0.9567* 1.0000
FGT(2) 0.5235* 0.5205* 0.4564* 0.3242 0.5407* 0.5052* 0.6450* 0.6827* 0.8899* 0.9829* 1.0000
der05_ea 0.2547 0.4285 0.4303 0.4944* 0.4171 0.4276 0.2853 0.1287 0.1942 0.1874 0.1653 1.0000
gini_all 0.3455 0.5916* 0.5381* 0.4935* 0.5710* 0.6581* 0.4059 0.1303 0.4366* 0.3672 0.2747 0.5175* 1.0000  
Source: Own calculations.  
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Table 4.1 
Indicators of institutions, conflict and corruption 
 
Measures of Institutions Name Source Acronym Years
Broad Base Institutions  Democracy Index  Polity IV Project  di  1989 - 2003
Broad Base Institutions Executive Constraints Index  Polity IV Project eci  1989 - 2003
Broad Base Institutions Executive Constraints Index World Bank: Database of Political Institutions eciwb  1989 - 2003
Broad Base Institutions Electoral Democracy Index United Nations Development Programme edi  1990 - 2002
Broad Base Institutions Government Effectiveness Index Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) gei 1996-2004
Broad Base Institutions Legal Structure and security of property rights Index  Gwartney and Lawson (2005) lsi 1980-2003
Broad Base Institutions Political Constraints Index  Henisz, W. J. (2002) pci  1989 - 2004
Broad Base Institutions Press Freedom index Freedom House. pf 1993-2002
Broad Base Institutions Regime Durability Index  Polity IV Project rdi  1989 - 2003
Broad Base Institutions Regime Durability Index World Bank: Database of Political Institutions rdiwb  1989 - 2003
Broad Base Institutions Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business Index. Gwartney and Lawson (2005) regclbi 1980-2003
Broad Base Institutions Rule of Law Index Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) rli 1996-2004
Broad Base Institutions Regulatory Quality Index Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) rqi 1996-2004
Broad Base Institutions Voice and Accountability  Index Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) vai 1996-2004
Political Institutions Index of Electoral Disproportionality United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ied  1990 - 2002
Political Institutions Index of Effective Number of Parties United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ienp  1990 - 2002
Political Institutions Lower-Chamber Malapportionment (**) Snyder and Samuels (2001) lcm  1990 - 2002
Political Institutions  Particularism Index Seddon, Gaviria, Panizza and Stein  (2002) pi  1989 - 2001
Political Institutions Valid Votes Relative to Voting Age Population United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) vvrap  1990 - 2002
Political Institutions Woman’s Representation in the legislative chamber United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) wr  1990 - 2002
Measures of conflict Name Source Acronym Years
General Conflict Index Political Stability and Absence of Violence Index Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) psavi 1996-2004
General Conflict Rate of Deceitful Homicide index. (***) United Nations, Population Division, rdh 1990-2002
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2001, 2002).
For the beginnings of the nineties and 1995 CEPAL.
Labor Conflict Labour Standars index Mosley and Uno (2002). lsi  1990-2000
Labor Conflict Complains Presented Before the Union Freedom Committee. International Labour Organization (2005) freedom 1990-2004
Labor Conflict Days Not Work index (*) International Labour Organization (2005) dnw 1989-2004
Labor Conflict Strike And Lockout index (*) International Labour Organization (2005) sal 1990-2004
Political Conflict Violence Against Journalists index UNDP. Compiled by Munck vaji  1990 - 2002
Measures of corruption Name Source Acronym Years
Control of Corruption Control of Corruption  Index Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) cci 1996-2004
Control Measures Name Source Acronym Years
Ethnic Fractionalization’s index. (**) Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and Kurlat ef 1985-2001
Freedom to Trade Internationally index  Gwartney and Lawson (2005) fti 1980-2003
Gross Domestic Product  per capita (PPP)  Internationally Monetary Fund (IMF) gdp 1989-2004
Gross Domestic Product per capita (PPP) growth (annual %)  Internationally Monetary Fund (IMF) gdpr 1988-2004
Standar Deviation of the G. D. P. pc (PPP) growth (annual %)  Internationally Monetary Fund (IMF) gdprsd 1985-2004
Language Fractionalization’s index (**) Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and Kurlat lf 2001-2001
Index of Economic Reforms Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999), Lora (2001) ier 1989-2002
and CEPAL (2003)
Public Expenditures in Education CEPAL pee 1980-2000
 Public Expenditures in Health CEPAL peh 1980-2000
Religion Fractionalization’s index (**) Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and Kurlat rf 2001-2001  
(*) These measures are not reported for all countries and all the years in the study. “dnw”  do not appear for several 
years in Argentina and Costa Rica, and do not appear for any year in Bolivia, Colombia,  Dominican Rep. , Ecuador,  
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,  Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Similar is the case of “sal”. It does not have any 
observation for Haiti, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
(**)  For  these measures we only have one observation for each country.  
(***) This measure is not available for all years from 1990 to 2002. We have observations in the beginnings of the 
nineties, around 1995 and one more observation for each country in the period 1998-2001. 
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Table 4.2 
Selected indicators of  institutions 
                Broad Base Institutions                            
VAI RLI GEI
Argentina 
1996 0.604 0.281 0.451     
1998 0.290     0.173     0.456     
2004 0.490     0.706 -    0.329 -    
Bolivia 
1996 0.097     0.661 -    0.441 -    
1998 0.337     0.352 -    0.106 -    
2002 0.008     0.648 -    0.530 -    
Brazil
1998 0.589     0.083 -    0.102 -    
2002 0.345     0.323 -    0.203 -    
Chile
1998 0.652     1.269     1.413     
2002 1.072     1.237     1.257     
Colombia 
1996 0.066 -    0.463 -    0.071     
2000 0.525 -    0.655 -    0.311 -    
2004 0.473 -    0.698 -    0.176 -    
Costa Rica
1996 1.366     0.640     0.163     
1998 1.245     0.904     0.516     
2002 1.163     0.666     0.446     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.433     0.198 -    0.111 -    
2004 0.273     0.537 -    0.459 -    
Ecuador
1996 0.065     0.395 -    0.655 -    
1998 0.273     0.669 -    0.757 -    
2002 0.064 -    0.650 -    0.935 -    
El Salvador
1996 0.219 -    0.481 -    0.376 -    
2000 0.237     0.453 -    0.110 -    
2002 0.064     0.430 -    0.501 -    
Guatemala
2000 0.257 -    0.770 -    0.504 -    
Haiti 
2000 0.790 -    1.496 -    1.468 -    
Honduras 
1996 0.358 -    0.846 -    1.418 -    
1998 0.117     0.565 -    1.196 -    
2002 0.155 -    0.769 -    1.562 -    
Jamaica
1996 0.553     0.214 -    0.409 -    
2000 0.697     0.150 -    0.193 -    
2002 0.509     0.463 -    0.040 -    
Mexico
1996 0.230 -    0.122 -    0.124 -    
2002 0.363     0.306 -    0.214     
Nicaragua
1996 0.222 -    0.682 -    0.462 -    
1998 0.009 -    0.824 -    0.532 -    
2000 0.076 -    0.906 -    0.715 -    
Panama
1996 0.333     0.255     0.550 -    
2002 0.501     0.026 -    0.113 -    
Paraguay
1996 0.390 -    0.505 -    0.688 -    
2002 0.527 -    1.157 -    1.246 -    
Peru
1996 0.733 -    0.352 -    0.182 -    
2002 0.114     0.501 -    0.455 -    
Suriname 
1998 0.187     0.730 -    0.117 -    
Uruguay 
1998 0.744     0.542     0.666     
2002 0.948     0.539     0.525     
Venezuela
1998 0.163     0.636 -    0.892 -    
2000 0.326 -    0.823 -    0.831 -    
2002 0.412 -    1.063 -    1.130 -    
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005)  
and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). 
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Table 4.3 
Selected indicators of  conflict and corruption  
           General Conflict and Control of Corruption
PSAVI CCI
Argentina 
1996 0.475         -0.124
1998 0.448         0.224 -     
2004 0.240 -        0.442 -     
Bolivia 
1996 0.231 -        0.871 -     
1998 0.079         0.414 -     
2002 0.061 -        0.823 -     
Brazil
1998 0.384 -        0.096      
2002 0.109         0.064 -     
Chile
1998 0.609         1.198      
2002 1.033         1.533      
Colombia 
1996 1.247 -        0.433 -     
2000 1.734 -        0.401 -     
2004 1.694 -        1.443      
Costa Rica
1996 0.886         0.433 -     
1998 1.077         0.609 -     
2002 1.101         0.510 -     
Dominican Rep. 
2000 0.183         0.302 -     
2004 0.009 -        0.498 -     
Ecuador
1996 0.612 -        0.749 -     
1998 0.582 -        0.740 -     
2002 0.680 -        0.999 -     
El Salvador
1996 0.094 -        0.755 -     
2000 0.466         0.165 -     
2002 0.323         0.488 -     
Guatemala
2000 0.891 -        0.638 -     
Haiti 
2000 0.771 -        0.995 -     
Honduras 
1996 0.398 -        0.965 -     
1998 0.181 -        0.748 -     
2002 0.080 -        0.765 -     
Jamaica
1996 0.638         0.328 -     
2000 0.282         0.173 -     
2002 0.173 -        0.212 -     
Mexico
1996 0.362 -        0.148 -     
2002 0.246         0.457 -     
Nicaragua
1996 0.656 -        0.148 -     
1998 0.212 -        0.753 -     
2000 0.216         0.882 -     
Panama
1996 0.357         0.503 -     
2002 0.390         0.236 -     
Paraguay
1996 0.061 -        0.495 -     
2002 1.095 -        1.203 -     
Peru
1996 0.903 -        0.097 -     
2002 0.691 -        0.228 -     
Suriname 
1998 0.191 -        0.060      
Uruguay 
1998 0.602         0.419      
2002 0.859         0.806      
Venezuela
1998 0.370 -        0.772 -     
2000 0.442 -        0.614 -     
2002 1.175 -        0.935 -     
 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). 
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Table 5.1 
Indicators of income distribution and institutions 
LAC and advanced countries 
Late 1990s  
Advanced LAC Diff.
Distribution
   Polarisation (DER(.5)) 0.206 0.304 -0.098*
   Polarisation (DER(.75)) 0.186 0.271 -0.085*
   Inequality (Gini) 0.307 0.527 -0.220*
Institutions
   Rule of Law 1.4 -0.3 1.7*
   Voice and Accountability 1.2 0.2 1.1*
   Legal structure 7.7 4.5 3.2*
   Gov't Effectiveness 1.5 -0.3 1.7*
   Democracy 8.8 7.6 1.2*
   Political constraints 0.7 0.5 0.2*  
* = significant at 10% 
 
Table 5.2 
Correlations between indicators of income distribution and institutions 
Sample of LAC and advanced countries 
Late 1990s 
 
DER 0.5
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   Rule of Law -0.8118* -0.7402* -0.8191* -0.3326*
   Voice and Accountability -0.7571* -0.6077 -0.8196* -0.3028*
   Legal structure -0.7775* -0.6974* -0.8297* -0.3333*
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.8034* -0.5217 -0.8248* -0.2473*
   Democracy -0.3898* -0.3540* -0.5333* -0.064
   Political constraints -0.5843* -0.6351* -0.4947* -0.1937*
Gini
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   Rule of Law  -0.8324*  -0.7111*  -0.8354* -0.3495*
   Voice and Accountability  -0.7821* -0.507  -0.8430* -0.3395*
   Legal structure  -0.7953*  -0.7155*  -0.8452* -0.3566*
   Gov't Effectiveness  -0.8318* -0.6912  -0.8461* -0.2873*
   Democracy  -0.4069* -0.3635*  -0.5577* -0.0871
   Political constraints  -0.6187*  -0.6887*  -0.5326* -0.2541*  
* = significant at 10% 
period 1=early 1990s 
period 2=late 1990s and early 200s 
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 Table 5.3 
Model of indicators of income distribution on institutional measures 
Sample of LAC and advanced countries 
Polarisation Inequality
DER Gini
   Rule of Law -0.020* -0.046*
   Voice and Accountability -0.027* -0.067*
   Legal structure -0.009* -0.021*
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.015* -0.040*  
* = significant at 10% 
Note: OLS estimates controlling for log of per capita GDP (PPP) and dummy for LAC.  
 
 
Table 5.4 
Indicators of income distribution and institutions 
LAC 
Southern SA Andean SA Central America
Distribution
   Polarisation (DER(.5)) 0.308 0.301 0.302
   Polarisation (DER(.75)) 0.282 0.270 0.266
   Inequality (Gini) 0.524 0.522 0.532
   Poverty (USD 2 a day) 14.2 32.4 34.3
Institutions
   Rule of Law 0.115 -0.612 -0.354
   Voice and Accountability 0.438 -0.110 0.238
   Legal structure 5.357 3.710 4.482
   Gov't Effectiveness 0.200 -0.524 -0.310
   Democracy 8.214 7.600 7.167
   Political constraints 0.660 0.480 0.445
Other variables
   GDP per capita 8162 4501 4765
   Public spending in education (%) 3.5 4.3 4.2
   Public spending in health (%) 2.8 1.8 3.6
   Ethnic fractionalization 0.3 0.6 0.4
   Regional fractionalization 0.4 0.2 0.4  
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Table 5.5 
Indicators of changes in income distribution and institutions 
LAC, between early 1990s and early 2000s 
Southern SA Andean SA Central America
Distribution
   Polarisation (DER(.5)) 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.02 0.02
   Polarisation (DER(.75)) 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.01 0.02 0.02
   Inequality (Gini) 0.01 0.02 0.00
0.03 0.03 0.03
   Poverty (USD 2 a day) -0.4 4.2 -4.9
8.2 16.0 6.1
Institutions
   Rule of Law -0.04 -0.34 -0.11
0.91 0.42 0.18
   Voice and Accountability 0.42 -0.04 0.16
0.57 0.52 0.20
   Legal structure -1.31 -1.91 -0.22
1.23 1.60 1.75
   Gov't Effectiveness 0.05 -0.40 0.13
0.84 0.41 0.26
   Democracy 0.40 0.00 1.83
0.55 4.64 3.13
   Political constraints -0.07 -0.04 0.04
0.12 0.31 0.21  
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Table 5.6 
Correlations between indicators of income distribution and institutions 
Sample of LAC countries 
Polarisation (DER 0.5)
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   Rule of Law -0.5457* -0.6011* -0.4523* -0.4176*
   Voice and Accountability -0.4180* -0.4317* -0.3966* -0.2802*
   Legal structure -0.2688 -0.161 -0.3336 -0.106
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.4704* -0.5236* -0.3946 -0.2941*
   Democracy -0.2058 -0.2019 -0.2291 -0.1648
   Political constraints -0.0393 0.0522 -0.114 -0.089
Inequality (Gini)
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   Rule of Law -0.6272* -0.6467* -0.5831* -0.4289*
   Voice and Accountability -0.5136* -0.5032* -0.5267* -0.3303*
   Legal structure -0.3454* -0.2393 -0.4468* -0.1128
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.6044* -0.6702* -0.5218* -0.3531*
   Democracy -0.2772 -0.2623 -0.3264 -0.2358
   Political constraints -0.1476 -0.1215 -0.1385 0.025
Poverty (headcount ratio)
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   Rule of Law -0.6802* -0.7298* -0.7071* -0.3916*
   Voice and Accountability -0.5230* -0.4888* -0.5679* -0.2532*
   Legal structure -0.4992* -0.5127* -0.5562* -0.1814
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.6858* -0.7065* -0.6967* -0.2882
   Democracy -0.3869* -0.1622 -0.6911* -0.4336*
   Political constraints -0.3850* -0.4429* -0.319 -0.2144  
* = significant at 10% 
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Table 5.7 
Correlations between changes in indicators of income distribution and institutions 
Sample of LAC countries 
Polarisation (DER 0.5)
controling for
Unconditional GDP growth
   Rule of Law 0.020 0.141
   Voice and Accountability -0.271 -0.251
   Legal structure 0.074 0.146
   Gov't Effectiveness 0.039 0.214
   Democracy -0.233 -0.224
   Political constraints -0.019 0.000
Inequality (Gini)
controling for
Unconditional GDP growth
   Rule of Law -0.195 -0.159
   Voice and Accountability -0.404 -0.400
   Legal structure -0.050 0.009
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.231 -0.230
   Democracy -0.397 -0.389
   Political constraints -0.297 -0.283
Poverty (headcount ratio)
controling for
Unconditional GDP growth
   Rule of Law -0.5506* -0.372
   Voice and Accountability -0.407 -0.240
   Legal structure -0.465 -0.318
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.5302* -0.325
   Democracy -0.265 -0.244
   Political constraints -0.6777* -0.6807*  
 
Table 5.8 
Model of indicators of income distribution on institutional measures 
Sample of LAC countries 
                       Cross-section                                       Panel
Polarisation Inequality Poverty Polarisation Inequality Poverty
DER Gini Headcount DER Gini Headcount
   Rule of Law  -0.019* -0.036* -11.2*  -0.008 -0.027 -9.5*
   Voice and Accountability -0.024* -0.044* -9.2* -0.006 -0.029* -10.7*
   Legal structure -0.007 -0.012 -3.6* -0.001 -0.003 -1.8*
   Gov't Effectiveness -0.019 -0.035 -8.98 -0.001 -0.020 -9.4
   Democracy -0.001 -0.002 -2.7* -0.001 -0.003* -0.4
   Political constraints 0.015 0.015 -8.3 -0.006 -0.020 -17.3  
* = significant at 10% 
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Table 6.1 
Indicators of  control of conflict and corruption 
LAC and advanced countries 
Late 1990s 
Advanced LAC Diff.
   General Conflict (PSAVI) 0.8690 -0.1192 0.988*
   Control of Corruption (CCI) 1.2562 -0.3425 1.598*  
 
Table 6.2 
Correlations between indicators of income distribution and conflict and corruption 
Sample of LAC and advanced countries 
Late 1990s 
DER 0.5
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   General Conflict -0.6663* -0.7621* -0.1873 -0.291*
   Control of Corruption -0.7563* -0.7734* -0.0473 -0.2737*
* = significant at 10%.
Gini
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   General Conflict -0.6757* -0.7782* -0.2077 -0.2935*
   Control of Corruption -0.7836* -0.7941* -0.1124 -0.3146*
* = significant at 10%.
period 1 = early 1990s
period 2 = late 1990s and early 200s  
 
 
Table 6.3 
Model of indicators of income distribution on conflict and corruption measures 
Sample of LAC and advanced countries 
Conflict and Corruption
   General Conflict Control of Corruption
PSAVI CCI
  Polarisation (DER)  -11.85*  -4.480
   Inequality (Gini) -5.791* -2.646  
Note: OLS estimates controlling for log of per capita GDP (PPP) and dummy for LAC.  
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Table 6.4 
Indicators of conflict and corruption 
LAC 
Southern SA Andean SA Central America
   General Conflict (PSAVI) 0.214 -0.739 0.089
   Labor Conflict (LS) 11.1 20.4 18.1
   Control of Corruption (CCI) 0.136 -0.588 -0.485  
 
 
Table 6.5 
Indicators of changes in the conflict and corruption measures 
LAC, between early 1990s and early 2000s 
Southern SA Andean SA Central America
   General Conflict (PSAVI) 0.05 -0.26 0.35
0.92 0.57 0.29
   Labor Conflict (LS) 7.64 -4.01 0.83
6.79 12.69 9.82
   Control of Corruption (CCI) 0.25 0.12 -0.09
0.91 1.05 0.42  
 
 
Table 6.6 
Correlations between indicators of income distribution and conflict and corruption  
Sample of LAC countries 
Polarisation (DER 0.5)
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   General Conflict (PSAVI) -0.4486* -0.4859* -0.4120* -0.4346*
   Labor Conflict (LS) 0.3313* 0.1525 0.6848* 0.2155
   Control of Corruption (CCI) -0.1799 -0.0687 -0.2768 -0.0465
Inequality (Gini)
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   General Conflict (PSAVI) -0.4522* -0.4417* -0.4710* -0.4097*
   Labor Conflict (LS) 0.4190* 0.2559 0.7682* 0.2536
   Control of Corruption (CCI) -0.2977* -0.1892 -0.4273* -0.0757
Poverty (headcount ratio)
                       Correlations controling for
pooled period 1 period 2 GDP pc
   General Conflict (PSAVI) -0.5123* -0.5313* -0.5023* -0.2747*
   Labor Conflict (LS) 0.4211* 0.4318* 0.6251* 0.0949
   Control of Corruption (CCI) -0.4766* -0.4191* -0.5351* -0.1593  
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Table 6.7 
Correlations between changes in indicators of income distribution and conflict and 
corruption  
Sample of LAC countries 
 
Polarisation (DER 0.5)
controling for
Unconditional GDP growth
   General Conflict (PSAVI) -0.1619 -0.1219
   Labor Conflict (LS) -0.2986 -0.28
   Control of Corruption (CCI) 0.4011 0.567*
Inequality (Gini)
controling for
Unconditional GDP growth
   General Conflict (PSAVI) -0.4296* -0.4478*
   Labor Conflict (LS) -0.3422 -0.3233
   Control of Corruption (CCI) 0.2974 0.4474*
Poverty (headcount ratio)
controling for
Unconditional GDP growth
   General Conflict (PSAVI) -0.7269* -0.6428*
   Labor Conflict (LS) -0.4141 -0.3153
   Control of Corruption (CCI) -0.0953 0.2145  
 
 
Table 6.8 
Model of indicators of income distribution on conflict and corruption measures 
Sample of LAC countries 
PSAVI LS CCI
   Polarisation (DER)  -14.498* -29.2583 5.8861
   Inequality (Gini) -8.7571* 6.3265 0.9199
   Poverty (Headcount) -0.0157* 0.0194 -0.0053  
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Table 6.9 
Correlations between indicators of conflict and corruption and institutional measures  
Sample of LAC countries 
 
odel of indicators of conflict and corruption on income distribution and institutional 
General Conflict Control of Corruption Labor Conflict
Institutions
          Rule of Law 0.6875* 0.5787* -0.2546
          Voice and Accountability 0.7843* 0.2889* -0.3208*
          Legal Structure 0.5757* 0.5162* -0.467*
          Gov´t Effectiveness 0.4979* 0.7385* -0.1147
          Democracy 0.4018* 0.1097 -0.1692
          Political Constrains 0.3232* 0.0453 -0.3353*
* Significant at 10%
 
 
Table 6.10 
M
measures 
General Conflict
Distribution
PSAVI
   Polarisation (DER) -12.926* -11.854* -14.614* -13.270* -13.820*
   Inequality (Gini) -7.3356* -6.8553* -8.1770*-8.1127*-8.2423*
   Poverty (Headcount) -0.008 -0.007 -0.012 -0.01 -0.014
Institutions
   Voice and Accountability 0.4751* 0.3333* 0.4604*
   Rule of Law 0.5981* 0.5074* 0.6249*
   Gov't Effectiveness 0.3668* 0.1878 0.2441
   Political constraints 0.5461* 0.5034* 0.4938
   Democracy 0.0567* 0.0483 0.0577
Labour Conflict
LS
Distribution
   Polarisation (DER) 20.57686 14.43729 10.58299 -34.53754 -26.77927
   Inequality (Gini) 7.316207 2.453393 1.4267 3.4973 9.6958
   Poverty (Headcount) -0.105 -0.145 -0.083 -0.013 0.0228
Institutions
   Voice and Accountability -4.643498 -4.56102 -5.546
   Rule of Law  -7.6322*  -7.6424* -8.7726*
   Gov't Effectiveness -5.050688 -5.082 -5.693
   Political constraints -2.864039 -2.511 -2.806
   Democracy 0.0951271 0.1419 0.1188
Control of Corruption
CCI
Distribution
   Polarisation (DER) 6.644173 8.3341* 5.729763 4.61 5.854048 5.523862
   Inequality (Gini) 1.983604 3.055195 2.6274 0.8606 0.5765
   Poverty (Headcount) -0.003 0.0016 0.0023 -0.007 -0.006
Institutions
   Voice and Accountability 0.2290699 0.249431 0.1629
   Rule of Law 0.5537* 0.5697* 0.5029*
   Gov't Effectiveness 0.4947* 0.5528* 0.5190*
   Political constraints -0.014259 -0.046 -0.18
   Democracy -0.030343 -0.032 -0.036  
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Table B.1 
Indicators of  trust and other  values 
World Sample 
Late 1990s 
LAC Rest_world Diff. LAC Advanced Diff.
   People can be trusted 0.17 0.30 0.13* 0.17 0.37 0.2*
   Democracy is the best form of government 0.48 0.39 -0.09 0.48 0.47 -0.01
   Country is run by a few big interests 0.70 0.67 -0.03 0.70 0.57 -0.13
   Revolutionary actions are needed 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.05 -0.04*
   Inequality (Gini) 51.6 35.2 -16.4* 51.6 32.1 -19.5*  
 
 
Table B.2 
Correlations between indicators of values and income inequality (Gini)  
World Sample 
controling for controling for
simple GDP pc share of unskilled
   People can be trusted -0.3959* -0.2634* -0.3973*
   Democracy is the best form of government -0.1552 -0.0194 -0.1357
   Country is run by a few big interests 0.1034 0.0209 0.1496
   Revolutionary actions are needed 0.3296* 0.1581 0.3405*
* = significant at 10%.  
 
Table B.3 
Model of indicators of  value measures on income inequality (Gini) 
World Sample  
Gini GDP LAC
   People can be trusted -0.002 0.040* -0.093
   Democracy is the best form of government -0.005* 0.012 0.158*
   Country is run by a few big interests -0.001 -0.036 0.081
   Revolutionary actions are needed 0.002* -0.032* -0.037  
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Figure 3.1 
Polarisation, inequality and poverty in LAC 
Last survey available (early 2000s) 
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Source: own calculations.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 
Changes in polarisation, inequality and poverty in LAC 
Between early/mid 1990s to early 2000s 
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Source: own calculations.  
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Figure 4.1 
Broad Base Institutions: The Voice Accountability Index and The Rule of Law Index 
OECD and LAC countries  
Broad Base Institutions in The World
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Figure 4.2 
Broad Base Institutions: The Voice Accountability Index Through Time 
OECD and LAC countries 
Broad Base Institutions in The World
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Figure 4.3 
Selected Broad Base Institutions  
LAC countries 
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Figure 4.4  
Broad-based institutions indices 
Broad Base Institutions in LAC
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Figure 4.5 
General Conflict: The Political Stability And Absence of Violence Index 
OECD and LAC countries  
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Figure 4.6 
Selected Indicators of Conflict and Corruption  
LAC countries 
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Figure 4.7 
The labour conflict index 
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Figure 4.8 
Control of Corruption Index 
OECD and LAC countries 
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Figure 5.1 
DER index of polarisation and broad-based institution indices 
LAC and advanced countries 
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Source: own calculations.  
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Figure 5.2 
DER index of polarisation and broad-based institution indices 
LAC countries 
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Source: own calculations.  
 
Figure 5.3 
Poverty headcount ratio and broad-based institution indices 
LAC countries 
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Figure 5.4 
Measures of changes in income distribution and changes in broad-based institution indices 
LAC countries 
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Figure 6.1 
DER index of polarisation and general conflict and control of corruption indices 
LAC and advanced countries 
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Source: own calculations. 
Figure 6.2 
DER index of polarisation and conflict and control of corruption indices  
LAC countries 
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Source: own calculations. 
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Figure 6.3 
Poverty headcount ratio and conflict and control of corruption indices  
LAC countries 
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Figure 6.4 
Measures of changes in conflict and control of corruption indices  
LAC countries 
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Figure B.1 
Income inequality (Gini) and values  
World Sample 
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